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ABSTRACT
In December of 1966 the United States government decided to place a $375
million atomic accelerator in the all-white, rural town of Weston, Illinois. The small
town was located 30 miles west of Chicago, within an affluent suburban county named
DuPage. Residents of DuPage were thrilled to receive the atomic installation because it
would spark new economic growth in the area. However, the National Committee
Against Discrimination in Housing (NCDH) immediately protested the approval of the
Weston site. They opposed the site choice because of a documented history of racial
housing discrimination in and around Weston. In 1967, the NCDH hoped to utilize the
Cold War scientific research plant as political leverage to abolish racial housing
discrimination in suburban Chicago. This study argues that the eventual failure of the
NCDH’s Weston protest illustrates the limits of the federal fair housing policy changes
during the late 1960s.
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INTRODUCTION
On February 8, 1967, Jack E. Wood, Jr., and Edward Rutledge, Executive
Directors of the National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing (NCDH),
traveled to Washington, D.C., to testify before the Joint Congressional Committee on
Atomic Energy (JCCAE). They went to the nation’s capitol with one goal in mind: to
convince Congress to delay the approval of a $375 million atomic accelerator site
selection in Weston, Illinois until the town’s history of housing discrimination was
addressed.1 The small, farming village of Weston was located approximately thirty miles
west of Chicago and was situated in the predominantly white suburban county of
DuPage.2 To the local boosters, the construction offered a chance for their area to
become “The Atom Capital of the World.”3 To the NCDH, however, the decision was a
battle cry.
Immediately after Weston was awarded the scientific research prize on December
16th, 1966, the NCDH began to organize its opposition to the site’s approval. They
perceived that the rural site selection of the Atomic Energy Committee (AEC), by design,
excluded Chicago’s large African American population. Wood and Rutledge argued that
DuPage County possessed a long and documented record of preventing African
Americans the opportunity to purchase or rent homes. Additionally, racial housing
discrimination helped make the Chicago metropolitan area the most segregated city in the
country during the 1960s. To the NCDH, the culture of discrimination in and around
Weston made the AEC’s site choice morally and socially unacceptable. The NCDH
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recognized that the preexisting levels of housing discrimination in the Weston area would
prevent Chicago’s inner-city blacks from accessing the new federal jobs that would be
generated by the new technological windfall.4
Wood and Rutledge quickly realized that the Weston site approval process gave
them an opportunity to stall the AEC’s selection due to a set of 1960s civil rights
guarantees. The NCDH believed that John F. Kennedy’s 11063 executive order of 1962
and Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act both offered the necessary legal tools to
establish a fair housing requirement in all federal policies. In their 1967 congressional
testimony, the NCDH seized the new political momentum to argue for the establishment
of fair and open housing in suburban Chicago. They asserted that federal mandates
forced the federal government to use its money and power to help create equal
opportunities for racial minorities to obtain housing and jobs.
At the time of the AEC site announcement, the NCDH believed that the
government’s stance on awarding federal contracts to communities was
nondiscriminatory. However, their actions were anything but nondiscriminatory.
Instead, the NCDH argued that the federal government was supporting decisions that kept
the status quo by ignoring the efforts of suburban communities to keep racial minorities
out.
The written AEC site selection criteria, in accordance with Kennedy’s executive
order and Title VI, expressed in bold language that the agency would only consider
communities that were open to people of every race.5 During the site selection process,
the AEC maintained that it would strongly consider “the climate of equal opportunity and
nondiscrimination existing in the communities surrounding the six prospective sites.”6
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The NCDH believed that the choice of Weston flew in the face of the AEC’s earlier
assurance. The region’s longstanding and visible record of discriminatory practices in
housing led Wood and Rutledge to argue that, “Weston clearly fails to meet one of the
major AEC site selection criteria for its atomic installation.”7
Wood and Rutledge announced during the 1967 Joint Committee hearing that
they would welcome the atomic site choice if the Illinois legislature adopted an
enforceable fair housing law. The NCDH hoped to the use the AEC’s earlier fair housing
promise as a tool to open the suburban housing market to African Americans trapped in
Chicago’s isolated ghettos. Wood and Rutledge argued that the Joint Committee’s
unconditional approval of the Weston site would “have the effect of fastening even more
tightly the bands of discrimination, poverty and unemployment which now enchain
nearly one million Negroes to the Chicago ghettos.”8 If Kennedy’s executive order, Title
VI and the AEC site criteria were to be taken seriously, they believed, Congress held an
obligation to use the Weston site approval process to open up the resources of the suburbs
to Chicago’s African Americans. Wood and Rutledge demanded that the final
authorization of funding for the atomic research be postponed until Illinois passed a Fair
Housing Law. This study will argue that the ultimate failure of their attempt illustrates
the limits of the United State’s fair housing policy changes during the late 1960s.

THE MAJOR PLAYERS IN THE WESTON SITE PROTEST
Wood and Rutledge were the constant driving force behind the NCDH protest of
the atomic accelerator site choice. Three years prior to the AEC site announcement, the
two men would become the Executive Directors of the NCDH at a crucial juncture in the
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organization’s history. NCDH President Charles Abrams, a long-time activist for
housing rights in New York, believed that in the mid-1960s the NCDH had an
unprecedented chance to reform federal housing policies.9 Abrams became the President
in of the NCDH in 1961, the same year John F. Kennedy was elected President of the
United States. Kennedy’s earlier campaign promises gave Abrams and the NCDH reason
to hope that the federal government was going to start addressing the national trend of
racial housing discrimination. Eventually, Kennedy partially followed through on his
earlier guarantees by signing a 1962 executive order, which required the federal
government to ensure equal opportunities in all federally financed housing programs.10
In 1964 Abrams’ hired Wood and Rutledge to help utilize the new civil rights
commitment of the United States.
Abrams’ chose Wood and Rutledge because of their impressive experience in the
civil rights and housing field.11 Their expertise would immediately bring fresh
perspective and new direction to the NCDH. Perhaps even more important to Abrams
and the NCDH, was the fact that Wood and Rutledge came to the job with a
comprehensive knowledge of federal housing policies. Their ability to understand and
cooperate with politicians allowed them to exercise the new civil rights mechanisms to
abolish discriminatory barriers African American’s experienced when trying to purchase
or rent a home.
Wood and Rutledge redefined the scope of the organization as soon as they
assumed leadership roles in the NCDH. Rutledge declared that the goal was no longer
simply about abolishing housing discrimination. Instead, he stated that the NCDH would
now be focused “beyond the issue of discrimination per se to those broad social,
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economic, and political factors which support and extend the ghetto walls.”12 Under the
new leadership, the organization started to center its efforts on tackling the economic
issues facing racial minorities in the mid-1960s. The NCDH attempted to create more
economic equality by convincing the federal government to use its influence to make the
opportunities of the nation’s suburbs accessible to racial minorities.
In 1965, the NCDH launched an aggressive and sustained nationwide movement
for open housing in the nation’s suburbs. Early in their tenure, Wood and Rutledge
started this educational campaign to explain the significant impact of housing
discrimination on the job opportunities for low-income racial minorities. They argued
that for racial minorities living in isolated ghettos, “geography was their destiny.”13
Wood and Rutledge explained that if the economic opportunities of the suburbs were
accessible to all races it could have the potential to alleviate the unemployment of those
suffering in the nation’s inner-cities.14
During the post-war period, the nation witnessed a frightening rate of industrial
decentralization to suburbia. As jobs opportunities moved to the booming suburbs, innercity residents were experiencing increased economic hardships. Wood and Rutledge
recognized the vital connection between jobs and housing. They were alarmed to find
that many non-skilled and semi-skilled jobs were out of reach for African American
families trapped in the inner-city by racial housing discrimination. To reverse the pattern
of uneven development and segregation, they believed it was necessary to abolish racial
housing discrimination in the suburbs. In the mid-1960s, the NCDH demanded the
enactment of an enforceable and sweeping fair housing law to allow African Americans
to access the economic opportunities found in the suburbs.
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As Wood and Rutledge took over as Executive Directors in the mid-1960s, the
NCDH grasped some limited fair housing victories. They planned to utilize the new set
of legislative tools such as, Kennedy’s executive order and Title VI of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, to begin to break down the racial ghettos of American cities. Over the course
of the next few years, the open housing movement would become a crusade, as the
NCDH now demanded the federal government follow through on the nondiscriminatory
assurances expressed in the 1960s civil rights legislation.
It was in the midst of the NCDH campaign to disperse the ghetto that the AEC
site announcement was made. The decision of Weston, Illinois provided Wood and
Rutledge with an important opportunity to integrate Chicago’s suburbs. They felt
strongly that if they could persuade Congress to hold off on the final funding
authorization it would motivate the Illinois’ legislator to pass a statewide fair housing
law. To sway the legislators from supporting the federal funding of the Weston site,
Wood and Rutledge delivered a fiery testimony and many letters outlining the need for
fair housing protections in the area. They hoped to stall the Weston site approval by
convincing the majority of the Joint Congressional Committee that the AEC site choice
flew in the face of the new existing federal fair housing mandates.
The influential arguments of the NCDH ignited an intense debate over the final
approval for the atomic plant’s funding when it came to a Senate vote in June of 1967. In
the midst of the debate, a New York Times editorial articulated the mood of many
Americans during a summer in which race riots erupted in Newark and Detroit and antiwar protesters marched in Washington, D.C. “The nation is engaged in a bloody war in
Vietnam; the streets of its cities are swept by riots born of anger over racial and economic
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inequities,” the editorial observed. “It is a distortion of national priorities to commit
many millions now to this interesting but unnecessary scientific luxury.”15
The Chairman of the Joint Committee, Senator John Pastore of Rhode Island, was
one of the most steadfast opponents of the AEC decision and became the leading
advocate in the congressional fight against the site’s authorization. He spoke for the
needs of many struggling northern cities and his opinions were supported my other
Democratic senators representing the urban north. Following Pastore’s lead, northern
Democratic senators Walter Mondale, Philip Hart and Jacob Javits, were also passionate
proponents of the protest against the AEC site selection. They agreed that the federal
government for many years had facilitated the existing pattern of segregation in the
United States. During the late 1960s, these Democratic senators argued that they had a
moral responsibility to right earlier injustices by taking active steps to destroy the walls
of discrimination between the nation’s cities and suburbs. The liberal senators believed
that the open housing ideology of the NCDH could help cool the mounting tensions in the
nation’s cities.
Pastore’s concern over the civil rights problems related to the Weston selection
led him to invite the NCDH to testify to the Joint Committee. He hoped that the NCDH
testimony would convince enough of his colleagues that they needed to block the
approval of the Weston site until Illinois passed a statewide fair housing law. Pastore
underscored the irony when he wrote: “in the name of advancing science and technology
we should not be guilty of retreating from our boasted principles of equity, equality and
humanity.”16
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Not all of the politicians on the Joint Congressional Committee shared the
ideological views of those senators who sympathized with the NCDH. Support or
opposition of the Weston site selection was largely decided along urban/suburban and
liberal/conservative lines. Republican Joint Committee member Melvin Price of Illinois
was representative of the members who opposed the NCDH fair housing demands for the
site. He felt the rights of suburban homeowners in Illinois should not be infringed upon
with a federally forced state fair housing law. Price argued that the use of the AEC site
as a “civil rights carrot” to award to states with strong open housing legislation was
unacceptable. He believed, like many other Republicans on the Joint Committee, that
moral civil rights considerations should not be considered in the Weston site approval
because the federal government did not have any precedent for doing so. “Although we
have located many atomic facilities in the past twenty years this question has not
previously been raised,” he argued.17
Everett Dirksen, the influential Republican Senate Minority leader from Illinois,
was outraged by what he declared was “an evil precedent.” Not only would his state
suffer, but he also argued to protect the 29 other states that did not have fair housing
legislation at the time. During the final approval for the site, Dirksen delivered a biting
and sarcastic retort to the Democrat’s efforts to block the Weston site. “I’ll have a list
and I’ll keep it handy, just wait until appropriations, authorizations for federal projects
come along for these states. The same standard will apply,” Dirksen declared.18
Conservatives, like Dirksen, strongly asserted during the site approval debate that the
Joint Committee could not inflict its moral authority on state and local governments.
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Countering Dirksen, Pastore rejoined, “perhaps we are setting a precedent and the
precedent will be that any time a governmental agency brings up the question of fair
opportunity, they make that a predicate.”19 Democratic Senator Philip Hart of Michigan,
a notable civil rights advocate, also tried to soften the fear over the creation of an
unreasonable precedent. He believed that blocking the funding for the Weston site gave
the government an opportunity to right a previous wrong and practice what it preached.
To Hart, the atomic site approval presented a chance to provide all citizens with equal
access to good jobs, a decent home and a quality education. Senator Hart’s statements
reiterated the ideology of Wood and Rutledge. Such aspirations for equal opportunity to
jobs and housing in Weston would only become a reality if the Senate acted on the
mandate of Title VI and Kennedy’s executive order. Otherwise, Hart believed that the
federal government “would have failed to take up the challenge of a future for citizens of
our blighted urban ghettos.”20

THE ORIGINS OF THE NCDH
To gain a deeper understanding of the 1967 fair housing philosophy of Wood,
Rutledge and that of the supportive legislators, a look at the earlier history of the NCDH
is imperative. The NCDH roots can be traced back to a local organization called The
New York State Committee on Discrimination in Housing (NYSCDH). The future
President of the NCDH, Charles Abrams, helped oversee the creation of the NYSCDH in
1948. Upon its creation the organization consisted of sixteen local civil rights groups, all
with the collective goal of ending racial discrimination in housing.21 The radical thoughts
of Abrams would form the basis of the New York Fair Housing Committee’s ideology,
which would also become the philosophy for its predecessor organization, the NCDH.
9

“If Negroes are integrated with whites into self-contained communities without
segregation,” Abrams believed, “initial tensions tend to subside, differences are
reconciled and cooperation develops–in short, an environment is created in which
interracial harmony will be achieved.”22
The New York Fair Housing Committee was created in response to the emerging
housing crisis for urban African Americans, during one of the largest racial demographic
shifts in United States history. In the Second Great Migration, occurring after World
War II, a total of 1.5 million African Americans moved from the rural south to the
nation’s northern cities. The demographic shift was one of the largest population
movements of the twentieth century and rapidly changed the racial makeup of the urban
north.23 Like the first movement of southern blacks northward during World War I, the
second wave of the African American Great Migration increased the level of tension and
violence between whites and racial minorities who attempted to buy and occupy housing
in the urban north.24 It was in this historical context that the NCDH emerged to address
the escalation of racial segregation in the urban north.
As African American’s increasingly moved into northern cities, whites just as
quickly relocated to the suburbs under the banner of their collective whiteness. Whites
were able to flee the nation’s cities with the help of federal mortgage assistance
programs. Home ownership programs, such as the Federal Housing Administration
(FHA) and Veterans Administration (VA) loans, were put in place during the New Deal
era. The FHA and the VA provided low-interest, long-term loans to whites, allowing
millions of Americans to become new homeowners.25 The government subsidized loans
expanded housing construction to unprecedented levels in the excitement of borrowing
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and building. However, African Americans found it increasingly difficult to get in on the
housing boom provided by lower interest rates, often finding their neighborhoods were
“redlined,” from being eligible.26
The mass suburbanization of whites and the ghettoization of blacks was one of the
most profound population shifts of the twentieth century. In American Apartheid,
Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton provide strong evidence of how post-war federal
housing policies contributed significantly to the decline of the inner-city by encouraging
the selective out-migration of middle-class whites to the suburbs.27 Migrant African
Americans’ hopes for achieving equality often went unrealized, as they found a de facto
segregation system in the urban north that enforced the color line just as effectively as its
de jure southern counterpart.
In the late 1940s, Charles Abrams declared that federal housing policies were
effectively containing African Americans by their race in the ghettos of American cities.
He observed that the results of federal housing policies effectively concentrated the poor
in central cities and dispersed the affluent to the suburbs. It was abundantly clear to
Abrams and his fellow fair housing activists that New Deal reforms encouraged and
facilitated private home ownership for white families while leaving black families
behind.28
The year that the NYSCDH was founded was a significant one for fair housing
reform. The Shelley v. Kraemer decision in May of 1948 prohibited neighborhood
property owners from refusing to sell or rent to ethnic and racial minorities. This gave
civil rights activists, such as Abrams, the momentum they had been waiting for. The
NYSCDH was quickly created in order to use the weight of the Shelley decision to attack
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the institutional racism of the FHA on the local, and soon the national level. Open
housing advocates hoped that with concerted action they could abolish residential
segregation once and for all.29 However, their initial optimism turned to disappointment,
as the Shelley decision failed to prevent the FHA from underwriting mortgages
containing racial covenants. After 1948, the FHA continued to encourage the growth of
suburbs, which still blocked African American home ownership, by refusing to provide
loans to racially mixed neighborhoods.
It did not take long for the NYSCDH to expand its scope to the national level.
The Housing Act of 1949 sparked the need for a national committee for fair housing.
When the federal government adopted the Housing Act of 1949 it created an
unprecedented opportunity to reshape cities by race through a system of grants for major
federal funding of local urban redevelopment projects. The New York open housing
advocates quickly realized the need to create a larger organization to pressure the federal
government to integrate the nation’s cities.
Quickly after the Housing Act of 1949 was accepted, the NYSCDH decided to
hold a national conference to brainstorm ways in which it could influence and reform the
new federal urban renewal policies. At the conference, a group of New York fair housing
activist decided to create a national committee to undo the legacy of discrimination in the
nation’s suburbs and cities. Thus, the National Committee Against Discrimination in
Housing (NCDH) was officially formed in June of 1950. The members were united in
purpose; unanimously agreeing the NCDH should “provide a mechanism for the pooling
of national and local organization resources.”30 The NCDH was created with the intent
of maintaining a limited role, stating “it would be unwise for the new group to assume
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functions which might leave the organization open to jurisdictional disputes.” The
members also decided that the mission of the NCDH program “should be one of action
primarily and research secondarily.”31
The initial national headquarters of the NCDH consisted of a tiny, ten feet by
fifteen feet office, which also served as the office for the earlier NYSCDH.32 The
organization started out as a modest independent research committee. In 1950, the fair
housing committee was made up of fifteen national labor, religious and civil rights
groups, all working towards the goal of open housing.33 These organizations sought to
use their collective strength to transform the direction of federal and local housing
policies. In doing so, the NCDH hoped it could begin to break apart the nation’s racial
ghettos and spark real change in the segregated conditions of society.34

1950s: NCDH EFFORTS TO TEAR DOWN THE WALLS OF DISCRIMINATION
From its conception in the early 1950s, the NCDH gradually grew into somewhat
of a social movement. The organization brought a variety of interest groups together to
engage in a direct action protest against federal and local housing policies that promoted
segregation. The NCDH sought to accomplish a nation-wide, open housing market by
removing restrictions based on race, creed, and national origin. For the next few decades,
it would be the only national agency working in civil rights field that focused exclusively
on fair housing issues.
In addition to its direct action protest of the 1950s, the NCDH attempted to reform
the segregated conditions of the United States by exposing the reality of racial
discrimination in housing markets. By informing the public of the benefits of
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desegregated housing, the organization hoped to break down the barriers racial minorities
encountered when trying to move into white residential areas. Research was a primary
focus as well as providing legal assistance to those ready to challenge discrimination in
the housing market. Another important mission of the NCDH was their publication of
newsletters and reports. For instance, the bi-monthly publication Trends in Housing was
an important way for the NCDH to spread the word about issues related to the open
housing struggle. The most important objective of the NCDH, however, was to place
constant pressure on the Housing and Home Financing Agency (HHFA) and the Public
Housing Authority (PHA) to change racial policies on open occupancy and racial
integration.35
After the NCDH was created its predominant focus was on reforming the new
federal housing policies adopted after the Housing Acts of 1949 and 1954. These two
Housing Acts dramatically reshaped the relationship of the federal government with the
nation’s cities. For instance, the passage of the Housing Act of 1949 created the Public
Housing Administration (PHA) to oversee a quickly growing public housing program.
The PHA would construct 810,000 public housing units in six years. Suburban historian,
Kenneth Jackson describes that “the result, if not the intent of the public housing program
was to segregate the races, to concentrate the disadvantaged in the inner cities and
reinforce the image of suburbia as a place of refuge.”36 The Housing Act of 1949 also
provided funds for massive urban redevelopment programs in American cities, providing
municipalities with the funds to clear slums and make way for new growth. Five years
later, the passage of the Housing Act of 1954 enabled the Eisenhower administration to

14

provide municipal government’s with a staggering amount of money in order to reshape
their cities along racial lines.
The National Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB) was a key lobbying
force behind the new Housing Acts, because their enactment established the legal and
political tools for local real estate interests to designate and clear poor urban
neighborhoods. The NCDH believed that the invested interest of the NAREB in the the
passage of the legislation came from their desire to further restrict the mobility of African
Americans while increasing housing opportunities for whites. Charles Abrams
understood that “homeowners, home-builders, and mortgage-lenders seemed convinced
that people should live only with their own kind, that the presence of a single minority
family destroys property values and undermines social prestige and status.”37 Abrams’
believed that this ideology had become the post-war “gospel” of both local and national
policy makers who were making racial discrimination and neighborhood congruity an
official order. The NCDH identified that the intentional and enduring efforts of the real
estate industry were clearing out African American neighborhoods in the name of
progress. During the urban renewal process, many cities were using public housing and
slum clearance funds as oppressive devices for segregating people based on race and
class.38
The NCDH waged an all out attack on urban renewal policies. As watch dogs
they were quick to see how the federal housing policies created by the Housing Acts of
1949 and 1954, were critically reducing the supply of low-rent housing. The NCDH
constantly vocalized their disdain for the federal government’s discriminatory housing
policies during the 1950s. They argued that the passage of the 1949 and 1954 Housing

15

Acts began to critically reduce the supply of low rent housing in the nation’s cities.
During the implementation of these acts the nation witnessed a net loss of 51,000 low
rental units. The NCDH argued that racial minorities, who made up two-thirds of those
displaced, were forced into overcrowded ghettos because of restricted housing market
and high prices.
The implementation of the 1949 and 1954 Housing Acts led the NCDH to declare
that the federal government must stop utilizing its money and power to help local
municipalities segregate neighborhoods by race. They explained that the new federal
housing policies financed the displacement of African Americans’ while also limiting
their mobility through discriminatory lending practices. The NCDH understood that the
government was fostering and perpetuating a pattern of unequal and segregated
development within cities and suburbs in the north. In the early days of the organization,
the NCDH strongly criticized Eisenhower’s public housing and urban renewal programs
because they were being utilized to create the racial isolation of blacks in inner cities.
In the 1950s, the federal government’s role in the development of city’s expanded
significantly. The new Housing Acts allowed the federal government to finance local
government’s creation of spatial separation between races: African Americans in cities,
whites in suburbs. During the New Deal era the federal government began to limit
African Americans’ mobility by supporting the politics of racial “containment” that
defined the Cold War era.39 It was clear that the policies of slum clearance, urban
renewal and the creation of public housing were being used as tools for “Negro removal.”
These mechanisms were helping to establish a hard and fast pattern of racially
segregation on a city/suburb divide. The NCDH constantly focused on preventing the
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Housing Acts of 1949 and 1954 from supporting and reinforcing the spread of residential
segregation. The organization’s attempts at reform were largely unsuccessful as patterns
of segregation and uneven development continued throughout the decade.
1954 was another significant year for the NCDH. In May of that year the Brown
v. Board of Education of Topeka decision outlawed “separate but equal.” Along with the
Supreme Court ruling came cautious optimism for fair housing activist that federal
housing policies would begin to help establish residential integration. Frank Horne, the
Director of the Racial Relation Services (RRS) and a founding member of the NCDH,
believed that the Brown decision provided the opportunity for the Eisenhower
administration to remove all racial restrictions in the housing market. However, Horne
and his fellow NCDH members were extremely disappointed in the years that followed
Brown, as a federal housing policy of “separate but adequate” continued to be enforced.40
It quickly became apparent that Eisenhower’s housing program would continue to
ignore any policy changes resulting from the Supreme Court’s ruling of “separate but
equal is inherently unequal.”41 In more vivid language, urban historian Arnold Hirsch
captures the Eisenhower approach to the housing crisis as, “the popular image of a white
suburban noose looping around a black-occupied core.”42 In 1955 the NCDH charged
that, “federal, state and local authorities all bear the responsibility of seeing to it that
public funds should not be used to perpetuate discriminatory housing policies.”43 The
Brown decision ultimately did nothing to change urban renewal and public housing
policies from being used as both national and local footholds for segregation and
inequality. To address the failures of Brown at abolishing racial housing segregation, the
NCDH began lobbying for a federal executive order in 1956 to ban discrimination in
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publicly supported housing. Eisenhower would repeatedly ignore their efforts in the
remaining years of his second term.

1960s: A NEW ERA FOR THE NCDH
By the early 1960s the growing influence of the NCDH aided in the passage of
some new federal fair housing legislation. An increased level of interest and compassion
for the issue of racial discrimination in housing gave the NCDH a major boost in funding
as well. The increased funding led to the rapid growth of the organization during the
1960s. By 1964 the organization expanded from its original fifteen members to include
forty-six interracial and civil right organizations, including all of the national civil rights
organizations.44
In February of 1967, the same month Rutledge and Wood spoke before the Joint
Committee, the NCDH released a blistering report titled “How the Federal Government
Builds Ghettos.” Wood and Rutledge’s testimony would reference many conclusions of
that report. In strong and scornful language, the report accused federal policy of
continuing to foster geographical racial segregation between white suburbs and African
American ghettos. Their scathing analysis outlined the ways in which the federal
government facilitated racial segregation (both directly and indirectly) during the New
Deal era. It concluded that the federal government was “primarily responsible for
undergirding a ghetto system that dominates, distorts and despoils every aspect of life in
the United States today.”45
Throughout the post-war period, the placement of government jobs in the suburbs
was furthering unequal opportunities between white suburbanites and African American
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city dwellers. Federal agencies such as the AEC were overwhelmingly locating
government jobs in middle-class suburbs rather than in urban areas. New opportunities
for federal government employment were often made inaccessible by housing
discrimination against racial minorities. “The growth policies of New Deal liberalism
and the emergence of the Cold War military-industrial complex shaped the spatial
patterns of development in the postwar suburbs,” states urban historian Matthew
Lassiter.46 The NCDH charged that housing discrimination prevented African Americans
from accessing the new federal jobs at a level equal to whites.
Cold War politics considerably increased the amount of spending on civil defense
and federal scientific research programs. Between 1945 and 1970, a massive industrial
complex developed by Cold War military spending transformed the United States.
Federal incentives and tax policy aimed to promote suburban areas for new military and
scientific installations. New communities were being built in the urban periphery around
various scientific research plants during the early decades of the Cold War. The rise of
“cities of knowledge,” as historian Margaret Pugh O’Mara has called them, moved
economic activity away from the central cities.47 In the decades following World War II,
federal scientific research spending was turning quiet agricultural areas like Weston,
Illinois, into booming and elite suburbs. These “cities of knowledge” were systematically
cut off from the urban poor by the elimination of affordable housing through the zoning
code and racial discrimination.
The suburban placement of jobs was a major contributing factor to a long period
of urban decline. The lack of low and moderately priced suburban housing, combined
with loan practices that controlled suburban growth, meant that African Americans could
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not easily move to federal employment sites, ensuring unequal opportunities for federal
jobs. 48 The increased anger and hostility African Americans’ experienced from white
homeowners during this economic crisis would become extremely visible in a series of
violent race riots occurring in United State’s cities like Watts and Detroit during the mid1960s.
The lobbying efforts of the NCDH and the commodity race riots during the 1960s,
made it clear that racial discrimination in housing was real and preventing the nation
from achieving the goals of integration and equality. The shift in federal policy during
this period was largely due to the pressure of civil rights groups and an increased
awareness of housing discrimination against African Americans. At long last the fair
housing movement was realizing some of its objectives and was slowly becoming a
national political trend.
President Kennedy’s 1962 executive order was one of the first and most
significant fair housing victories that the NCDH obtained. At the same time, the
executive order disappointed the NCDH because it was limited in scope, only covering
housing that would be built in the future. It was a partial order that provided for housing
built or bought with federal aid or financed by private mortgages guaranteed or insured
by federal agencies. The order left much of the nation’s housing stock uncovered
because independent banks and savings and loans with federally insured deposits were
exempt. Another major flaw to the implementation of the law was that it did not provide
any way to enforce the legislation. While Kennedy’s executive order was limited and
difficult to enforce, the spirit of the legislation would be open to a broader interpretation
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by the NCDH. The order did state that it prohibited discrimination in all federally
assisted private housing.
The 1962 fair housing victory was bolstered by the passage of Title VI within the
1964 Civil Act. Title VI prohibited racial discrimination in federal housing and created
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The NCDH was not
satisfied with Title VI because it still did not forbid discrimination in every federal
program. The NCDH explained that the legislation would exclude programs of insurance
or guarantee, thus exempting nondiscrimination in the sale of private homes obtained
with a FHA or VA mortgage. Like its predecessor, Kennedy’s executive order, the
enforcement of Title VI was ineffective, largely because HUD officials continued to
transfer authority to local officials. With no real enforcement mechanisms, whites
continued to resist any kind of open occupancy in the private market and in public
housing. However, the passage of Title VI created another important declaration by the
federal government that they would play a part in abolishing racial housing
discrimination.49
Title VI and Kennedy’s executive order marked a dramatic change in the
relationship between federal policy and metropolitan development. After three decades
of federal policy that helped to establish racially segregated neighborhoods, some federal
officials began to declare their commitment to open occupancy and the promotion of fair
housing. The 1960s guarantees gave the NCDH new mechanisms and momentum to
force the federal government to reverse the tide of housing discrimination that they
facilitated for so many years in the post-war era.
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RESISTANCE OF WHITE HOMEOWNERS TO THE GOALS OF THE NCDH
As the open housing movement demands grew louder, a heated and emotional
reaction emerged from white suburban homeowners. The intrusion of African Americans
into their suburban communities was seen as a threat to their personal and financial
security. Suburban historian Becky M. Nicolaides states, “If they laid a claim to any
right, it was that of owning a home and ensuring that this ownership would be
protected.”50 Whites fought to protect their property values by preaching about the
sanctity of local suburban governments and against the corruption of encroaching urban
African Americans. The fear of racial transition in their communities helped create a
housing market that demanded residential segregation and the belief that the government
did not have any business interfering with this market by forcing integration on whites.51
While the New Deal’s policies had been liberal in many respects, they still
retained many racist assumptions. The housing and finance industry of the FHA, for
example, effectively operated on segregationist premises and taught whites valuable
lessons about what their privilege awarded to them. The New Deal programs trained
whites to invest in a philosophy regarding race and property. Suburban historian David
Freund summarizes that “a theory about property value and race was codified by ‘urban
experts,” planners, academics, municipal officials, federal housing officials and published
their findings.”52 White suburbanites would embrace the ideology of the New Deal
housing reforms and mobilized politically to restrict their neighborhoods from nonwhites.
By the 1960s however, the new liberals began to revise their views on race, a
change that angered many whites. Many suburbanites were extremely concerned about
federal fair housing intervention in their communities. The civil rights programs of the
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1960s and the integration philosophy of the NCDH seemed to be aimed at undermining
their quality of life. Democrats who supported fair housing were starting to earn the
reputation amongst blue-collar whites as an elite minority that was suppressing the
interests of the majority. The new liberal housing and civil rights reforms galvanized the
white working-class to politically organize as a collective group on a national level.
During the late 1960s white working-class politics broke free from the Democratic Party
and form an organized “conservative backlash” to resist forced racial and economic
change.53
Recent scholarship on post-war suburbanization has closely examined the roots of
suburban homeowner’s post-war politics and by doing so has traced the origins of a
rightward turn in their politics of independence. A group of “new suburban historians”
has repeatedly argued that property ownership was the central way many United State’s
suburbanites collectively identified in the twentieth century.54 These accounts have
demonstrated that the creed of property rights and the political engagement it encouraged
would become the source behind the 1960s conservative movement and the 1970s tax
revolts. Furthermore, they have argued that suburban homeowners believed that their
restrictive politics were not driven by racism but rather by recognition that racial
integration threatened the “free market” for their property and the integrity of the local
governments. In the post-war era, white’s understood all too well the political lessons
about the relationship between property, racial privilege, and political rights.55
In affluent suburbs like DuPage County, where the atomic accelerator site was
located, residents also latched onto a philosophy of class exclusion. By the late 1960s,
new fair housing laws meant that class discrimination would become the successor tool
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for the practice of state-sponsored residential segregation. The protection of class
privileges of affluent suburbanites consistently blocked the issue of racial integration
from their communities. Instead, threats of integration were passed over to working-class
white communities such as Cicero, where the bloody race riots of 1951 took place.56
Suburban historian Kenneth Durr has explained that blue-collar whites, like those living
in the Chicago suburb of Cicero, were ever more "preoccupied with community
boundaries...because they were not segregated by sheer wealth."57 These residents
believed that the objectives of liberalism were not going to protect the security of their
jobs, the worth of their neighborhoods, or the quality of their lives. Out of a fear of
integration and the negative economic effect it would bring to their communities, the
white working-class was able to organize a strong and effective counter-attack to the
political efforts of the NCDH. In the late 1960s, legislators who sought to reform
discriminatory housing policies were left to face the political wrath of working-class
constituents who no longer trusted the Democratic Party.

CHICAGO’S 1966 FAIR HOUSING PUSH
It was not just white homeowners who resisted the goals of integration. The open
housing movement would also encounter stiff opposition from urban and suburban
African Americans. The NCDH fair housing movement in the urban north was never
able to gain the same energy and momentum as the southern civil right protest. One
explanation for the limited support the NCDH received was the fact that many northern
African American’s preferred to live in all-black communities. The idea that African
American’s possessed better economic opportunities in their own communities flourished
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in 1966, as the Black Power movement was taking hold in United States cities. In
addition, many local African American leaders did not back the integration philosophy of
the NCDH, because they suspected that moving into white communities would weaken
their own political strength and economic independence. The fair housing ideology was
often out of touch with the interests and desires of the masses in the urban north. The
failures of the NCDH stemmed from its refusal to acknowledge the fact that many
African American’s chose to live with people who shared their skin color.
The limited level of support for the open housing movement could be clearly seen
as Martin Luther King, Jr., brought the focus of his non-violent civil rights movement on
Chicago in 1966. King decided to move to Chicago in order to draw the attention of the
nation to the realities of racial segregation and inequality outside of the south. On
January 7th, 1966, he formed the Chicago Freedom Movement (CFM), a coalition
between his Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and local Chicago civil
rights leaders such as Al Raby.58 The CFM decided to attack segregation in the urban
north by focusing on the volatile issue of housing discrimination. To gain the attention of
Chicago’s political and business leaders, the movement staged a series of open housing
demonstrations and marches in the summer of 1966. Because King was a national figure,
the marches drew major media attention to racial segregation and inequality outside of
the south. However, the CFM protest never gained much backing from Chicago’s
African Americans community because they continued to prefer to live in all-black
residential areas. 59
The CFM also failed to grasp the complicated layers of social class amongst
African American’s in the Chicago metropolitan area. Differences in income,

25

occupation, and status became manifest in a growing residential segregation of the black
population of Chicago by class. Blacks fortunate enough to have the resources fled the
crowded inner-city, leaving the poor who would continue to bear the brunt of racial and
class segregation as they were trapped in the city’s worst housing.
After World War II, the rise of an African American middle-class allowed its
members to create their own communities in segregated suburbs. The popular historical
description of twentieth century suburbanization in the United States all too often
excludes this group of African Americans suburban homeowners from its story. Recent
scholarship of urban historian Andrew Weise reveals that African Americans created
their own communities in spaces outside of the nation’s cities. He explained how “spatial
and social mobility were two sides of the same coin.” African American’s routinely
moved out of metropolises as they joined the middle-class.60 However, the class status of
African American suburbanites’ was always in a precarious position, as their
neighborhoods were the most vulnerable to encroachment by lower-class, inner-city
African Americans. Because of this perceived threat, black suburban homeowners
constantly fought to keep poorer blacks out in order to insulate themselves and protect
their economic stability in the post-war period.61
The divided consciousness of blacks in Chicago restricted mass protest
mobilizations, created far-ranging disagreements over techniques, and limited the
movement’s power to achieve its open housing objectives. The failure of the CFM
stemmed largely from King and his supporters’ unfamiliarity with Chicago neighborhood
dynamics. Chicago was much larger than any urban area that King and the SCLC had
dealt with in the southern civil rights struggle. In 1966, the CFM led by King did not
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fully understand the complicated reasons behind African American settlement patterns in
the urban north. Black Power leaders in Chicago rejected the idea of social and
economic mobility as defined by moving into white neighborhoods. The integration
goals of open housing movement were not appealing to most inner-city blacks and the
popularity of the black isolation philosophy in the late 1960s illustrated this fact.62
The NCDH and Martin Luther King, Jr. failed to accept that poor blacks wanted
no part of integrating white suburban communities and middle class blacks wanted no
part of poor blacks’ problems. The lofty goals of the open housing movement were
simply unpopular among most blacks, rich and poor. While the NCDH and King were
unable to ignite massive street protests like those in the southern civil rights movement,
they were however able to influence the passage of some limited fair housing laws during
the 1960s. These new federal promises in the form of housing legislation gave the
NCDH some important new political influence in their struggle to abolish discrimination
in the nation’s housing markets.

THE FEBRUARY 1967 CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY OF THE NCDH
In order to compel the federal government to enforce its earlier nondiscriminatory
declarations, Wood and Rutledge chose the issue of the Weston site approval to wage an
all out administrative attack. The NCDH utilized their 1967 testimony against the atomic
site selection to block the AEC site selection until Illinois passed enforceable, statewide
fair housing legislation that covered the private market. The new federal legislative
mandates of the 1960s reinforced the legitimacy of their challenge. If the government’s
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fair housing promise could be trusted, the NCDH maintained that there was no way that
the Weston site could be approved.
By 1966, the NCDH was able to steer the Joint Committee to several legislative
mandates that were meant to prevent discrimination against racial minorities in search of
housing. The NCDH believed the spirit of the executive order and Title VI established
significant new powers to help open up Chicago’s suburbs. Wood and Rutledge
explained that these legislative protections demanded that African Americans could
participate in and enjoy the benefits of all federal programs. The legal guarantees of the
federal government would essentially be meaningless, they argued, if the AEC placed
their scientific research plant in an area where federal job opportunities were inaccessible
to racial minorities.63 Wood and Rutledge concluded their testimony by demanding that
the federal government had a moral responsibility to reject the Weston site unless Illinois
passed an enforceable fair housing law.
In the midst of a Cold War with the Soviet Union, the NCDH constantly
reinforced the idea that the United States held an ethical obligation to block the approval
of the Weston site construction. The NCDH argued that if the site were accepted without
Illinois and Chicago taking any action to open the job and housing market, the United
States would be sending a message that endorsed racial inequality and segregation. In
1966, Kennedy’s Presidential successor Lyndon B. Johnson understood this dilemma and
he understood the importance of the federal government’s role in taking a progressive
stance on the issue of fair housing. Johnson pledged that the 1962 executive order called
upon the “federal government to undertake action programs to achieve full and equal
opportunity as a fact in government life.”64 Rutledge underlined Johnson’s word “action”
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when he demanded that the federal government use its funds to provide equal
employment opportunities and an open housing market for all citizens. He warned the
Joint Committee in his testimony that if this step was ignored then “this nation will have
forfeited in advance the opportunity to utilize the last remaining land resource in the
Chicago area to facilitate outward movement and suburbanization of thousands of Negro
families.”65 Wood also saw the Weston project as a “federal development effort” that
would create thousands of jobs, homes and businesses. He maintained that any such
federal effort should also follow the provisions of Title VI, which prohibited federal
spending in a racially discriminatory situation.
In their testimony, Wood and Rutledge continued to stress that the AEC’s site
selection criteria outlined the importance of the plant’s placement in an area with a
progressive civil rights record. Initially, Rutledge praised the AEC policy for setting a
strong civil rights model for other federal government installations to follow. In an
article appearing in the September 1966 issue of the NCDH publication Trends in
Housing, the organization stated “the AEC is to be commended for requiring an
outstanding fair housing record as the essential criteria in locating the site.”66 Rutledge
even hoped that the AEC precedent would encourage other federal agencies to assure that
equal employment and housing opportunities existed in potential sites for their
installations.
When the Weston site was announced Rutledge quickly changed his tone from his
earlier support of the AEC site selection requirements to adamant disapproval. He now
argued that the Weston decision not only “flies in the face of established federal policy,
but represents a major retreat from the position publicly enunciated by the AEC itself.”67
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In a 1967 New York Times article, NAACP President Clarence Mitchell asserted that “if
the AEC had set out to find a site where its colored employees, scientists and visitors
would be most likely to encounter discrimination in housing, Weston could clearly
qualify for that dubious honor.”68 The NCDH felt that AEC site selection process must
have completely ignored its own fair housing requirements since the Weston area was
notorious its record of racial housing discrimination.
In order to sway the Joint Committee members from voting to approve the
Weston site, the NCDH tried to link the decision to the ongoing urban crisis. The urban
riots of the 1960s gave the NCDH mission an increased urgency as it was clear that
something must be done to alleviate the unemployment problems of the inner-city.
Rutledge threatened that if the Joint Committee approved the Weston site without the
adoption of Illinois’s fair housing legislation, it would only intensify the problems of
discrimination and poverty for nearly one million African Americans living in Chicago.
He argued “the government of all the people should not and must not enter into a
partnership with suburban communities which deliberately exclude Negro citizens from
the job and housing market.”69
During the mid-1960s, politicians and the mass media were extremely concerned
about the deepening urban crisis in cities like Chicago. While the northern open housing
protest did not gain massive support among Chicago’s African Americans, it did attract
national attention towards the issue of housing discrimination in Chicago. The question
of how to deal with the angry and riotous urban crisis was a large part of the national
political discourse at the same time of the site approval debate in the summer of 1967. At
a time when cities were exploding with anger over racial inequality, the issue of the
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atomic site selection provided the NCDH with an opening to change the federal
government’s stance on racial housing discrimination in the suburbs.
The connection between job opportunities and open housing was a significant and
reoccurring point of Rutledge’s and Wood’s testimony. According to the NCDH, racial
housing barriers were canceling out employment opportunities where government
installations and plants with federal contracts were located.70 The NCDH concluded that
the problem of urban poverty was intensified by the lack of available open housing close
to new jobs. While the NCDH recognized that the unemployment problem of urban
African Americans came from interrelated causes, they emphasized that “there can be no
question that the lack of access to suitable housing is a major obstacle in the ghetto
dweller’s search for a job.”71 The movement of businesses out of the city created a
spatial chasm between urban African Americans and jobs during the post-war decades.72
Without Illinois fair housing guarantees, the NCDH warned that the federal
installation would be just another example of how the federal government continued to
facilitate patterns of racial housing segregation in white suburbs and African American
inner cities. The NCDH tried to persuade the Joint Committee that their decision had the
potential to affect two critical national issues: unemployment and open housing.
Rutledge’s testimony demanded that “federal government installations of every
magnitude and importance should be located only in communities which are committed
to a policy of and are taking affirmative action toward achieving integration.”73 He went
on to argue that “If Negroes cannot live or work in the Weston area then their legal right
to AEC employment is essentially meaningless and without foundation.”74 In Rutledge’s
opinion the atomic accelerator site could help relieve the depression-level unemployment
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rates among urban blacks. With the evidence of suburban Chicago housing
discrimination and the new federal legislative assurances, Rutledge remained confident
the Joint Committee would delay the approval of the Weston site.

THE RESULTS OF THE WESTON PROTEST
The 1967 debate over the atomic site approval represented the larger ongoing
struggle between civil rights politics and suburban homeowners. While the NCDH
gathered enough support and influence to stall the Joint Committee, they ultimately failed
to gain the majority backing they needed to block the final funding authorization of the
atomic accelerator. The NCDH open housing movement was unsuccessful because it
was never able to garner the same attention and support as the massive civil rights protest
in southern cities. While the bureaucratic attack of the NCDH did gain the support of a
large group of liberal senators, it simply did not gain enough public support to force
conservative Republicans and Southern Democrats to take its demands seriously.
In June 1967, the Joint Committee made its final funding recommendations for
the plant. The Senate majority report signaled the failure of Wood’s and Rutledge’s
protest, as it recommended the approval for the initial design and construction of the
atomic accelerator in Weston. However, Chairman Pastore submitted a dissenting
opinion, which echoed the NCDH demands during their February testimony. His report
argued that the AEC project be deferred because the approval of the Weston site, would
only worsen racial tensions that were already exploding in the nation’s cities. In a
desperate effort to block the site’s approval, the Rhode Island Senator shouted “this is the
way you make the summer hotter.”75 Pastore went on to plead to Congress to withhold
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the final approval of the Weston site by asserting “the soul of man is at stake when his
dignity is endangered by discrimination. Let us be done with such inequality.”76
In the end, Everett Dirksen was able to unite the Republicans with the Southern
Democrats to defeat the protest of the NCDH and the liberal senators. Dirksen’s
persistent attack against the creation of a civil rights precedent in government
installations ultimately won the favor of the majority of the Joint Committee members.
Many policymakers feared that their own states would be judged against on a similar
open housing model in the future. Furthermore, the senators knew that their suburban
homeowner constituents would not approve of a vote withholding appointment of a
federal installation to promote integration. Suburban homeowners made up a powerful
and influential “silent majority,” that were capable of strongly influencing domestic
politics during the late 1960s. Politicians representing these constituents knew that
blocking the approval of the atomic site would be committing political suicide. The
Weston atomic site approval ultimately suffered from the Joint Committee member’s lack
of enthusiasm and desire to abolish racial discrimination in Chicago’s housing market.
On July 12th, 1967, the Weston site was eventually approved by a vote of 47 to 37
that closely followed political party, as well as suburban/city lines. Two weeks later
President Johnson signed the bill and approved the first large funding allotment for the
atomic accelerator. However, after signing the bill Johnson wrote a statement regarding
his own concern over the availability of jobs and housing for the new employees at the
atomic research plant in Weston. Holding true to his support of civil rights issues,
Johnson demanded the AEC take “bold affirmative action” to insure that “Americans of
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all races should have an opportunity to apply to work, and for housing, in connection
with this great scientific venture.”77
While the NCDH failed to influence the final site selection of the AEC, they did
achieve several limited fair housing victories as a result of their protest. Their verbal
attacks against the Weston site influenced the creation of ethical objectives in the
laboratory itself. In 1969, the leadership of the national atomic accelerator adopted a
Policy on Human Rights, which declared their “support of the rights of the members of
minority groups in our laboratory and in its environs is inextricably intertwined with our
goal of creating a new center of technical and scientific excellence.”78 The Director of
the laboratory, Robert Wilson, also created an aggressive affirmative action program
aimed at employing minorities by setting up training programs for residents of Chicago’s
ghettos. The efforts were impressive enough to change the position of Clarence Mitchell
of the NAACP from his earlier opposition towards support for the laboratory once it was
open.
In addition, the Weston protest of the NCDH was somewhat influential on local
fair housing reforms in the suburbs of DuPage County. While statewide legislation was
never achieved, more than 30 communities in the area, including Weston itself, passed
open housing ordinances by 1968. The sustained protest of the NCDH for fair housing
made it impossible for local leaders to ignore the reality of housing discrimination in their
communities. During this period the energy and public support behind fair housing
reform forced a dramatic political shift in local and national politics, which would
eventually lead to the adoption of a federal fair housing law.
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THE 1968 FAIR HOUSING ACT
In 1968, the pressure for statewide open housing legislation in Illinois dissolved
because of the passage of a national Fair Housing Act, which mandated the abolishment
of discriminatory housing practices for all Americans. The legislation also marked a
significant reordering of federal policy towards housing.79 The national Fair Housing Act
was immediately hailed by the NCDH as a reversal of a thirty-year pattern in which the
policies of the federal government actively promoted housing discrimination against
African Americans.
For several years, President Lyndon B. Johnson pressured Congress to pass the
fair housing legislation, but was unable to gather enough support to pass it until 1968. A
series of dramatic events occurring in the late 1960s forced Congress to finally
acknowledge the nation’s increasing social tensions and act to resolve them. The antidiscrimination legislation almost certainly would have lacked the necessary support in
Congress if it were not for two significant historic events that swayed public and political
opinion.
One of these events was the 1968 release of a report by a commission headed by
Illinois’ Governor Otto Kerner. Johnson appointed the Kerner Commission, in the
aftermath of the urban riots to better understand crisis occurring in American cities
during the 1960s. The conclusions of the Commission warned that the nation was
“moving toward two societies, one black, one white – separate and unequal.” The Kerner
report recommended that the federal government enact a fair housing law and
desegregate housing by putting more low-income housing outside central cities.
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The other influential event in 1968, and by far the more profound one, was the
assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. on April 4th. The day after Martin Luther King,
Jr. was killed, Johnson urged the House to pass the fair housing bill as a tribute to the
civil rights leader. He believed that the federal government needed to make a strong
statement to ease the mounting pressure of the ensuing violent race riots in cities
throughout the United States. A week after King was murdered; the House followed the
President’s recommendation and passed the Senate’s version of the Fair Housing Act.80
The 1968 Fair Housing Act addressed the first recommendation of the Kerner
Report, which stated that the federal government should enact a fair housing law.
However, the Act did not address the second recommendation of the report, which
recommended the creation of more low-income units outside central cities. None of the
language in the Fair Housing Act required that the federal government encourage
suburban racial integration through the use of subsidized housing. Nor did the Fair
Housing Act forbid economic discrimination of any kind or require the government to
promote suburban economic integration through any means.
Although the Fair Housing Act was a landmark piece of civil rights legislation,
contemporary historians have challenged its success at eliminating housing
discrimination after 1968. Mechanisms to implement the anti-discrimination law were
intentionally written out of the Fair Housing Act in order to gain votes from moderate
Republicans like Everett Dirksen. The disappointments of the 1968 open housing
legislation have continued to lead toward the national trend of housing discrimination and
segregation. Since the passage of the Fair Housing Act, uneven development has
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persisted between the nation’s suburbs and inner-cities in more subversive ways through
exclusionary zoning and the private market.

CONCLUSION
In 1965 President Johnson gave the commencement speech at Howard University,
Jack E. Wood’s Alma Mater. In his historic speech, Johnson eloquently summarized the
purpose of the NCDH during Wood’s and Rutledge’s leadership.
We seek not just freedom but opportunity. We seek not just legal equity but real
human ability – not just equality as a right and a theory, but equality as a fact and
equality as a result. For the task is to give twenty million Negroes the same
chance as every other American to learn, grow, to work and share in society, to
develop their abilities – physical, mental and spiritual and to pursue their
individual happiness.81
In 1967, Wood and Rutledge saw the opportunity to use the symbolic power of a
multimillion-dollar scientific laboratory to abolish housing discrimination in the Chicago
suburbs. They hoped their influence would force the federal government to make good
on its earlier legislative promises to create equal opportunities in housing and
employment in the nation’s cities and suburbs. With the weight of the AEC’s atomic
installation, the NCDH believed it had a chance to offer the opportunities of Chicago
suburbs to African Americans. Wood and Rutledge were full of hope that a federal
action could help African American citizens in Chicago realize equal access to a good
job, a decent home and a strong education for their children.
In the end, the NCDH’s Weston protest never gathered enough strength to force a
substantial change in local and federal fair housing policies. The words and ideas of the
NCDH failed to capture the hearts and minds of the African American ghetto dwellers, as
they continued to choose racial solidarity over forced assimilation. Fair housing
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advocates also struggled to overcome the political power of suburban white homeowners,
who remained focused on protecting their property values from black encroachment. The
failed attempt of the NCDH in 1967 to reform Illinois’ fair housing legislation illustrates
the limits of the liberal changes in federal housing policies.
Ultimately, the NCDH Weston protest was unable to convince Chicago’s African
Americans, suburban whites, and the federal government to accept the goals of
integration. Today we still live with the legacy of the NCDH disappointments in our
nation’s segregated cities and suburbs. However, we also live with the hope expressed in
the words of Martin Luther King, Jr., who declared at the end of the 1967 summer, “that
the arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice.”82 Jack E. Wood, Jr.
and Edward Rutledge understood that the arc does not simply bend on its own. They
would dedicate their lives to making King’s vision a reality.
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